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traversable’ (p. 114) – finds itself realized in this study. The main chapters are
accompanied with thorough notes, and an extensive Bibliography and well-
managed index make this a valuable research resource. Using the diverse mani-
festations of écriture féminine as an analytical vehicle, the authors are able to
suggest productive ways of travelling through and alongside Cixous’s work. In so
doing, they do not baulk at exposing what some have seen as inconsistencies in
Cixous’s exposition of écriture féminine. Appropriately, though, they allow Cixous
to speak for herself: her project is to give the apple trees of gender a thorough
shaking ‘inside out, upside down’ (p. 30).
Perhaps if Adam had mustered a smile rather than a frown at Eve’s joyful apple-
gobbling, the flowering of oppositional ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ economies
would have been nipped in the bud.
Mary Bryden
Cardiff University
INTERROGATING CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE FROM A
GENDERED POINT OF VIEW: ASKING TOO MUCH, OR NOT ENOUGH?
Beverley Baines and Ruth Rubio-Marin, eds
The Gender of Constitutional Jurisprudence
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, xiii + 342 pp., ISBN 0–521–53027–X
(hbk), 0–521–82336–6 (pbk)
The Gender of Constitutional Jurisprudence is a wide-ranging and very interesting
survey of constitutional principles on gender and their enforcement by the consti-
tutional courts in 12 countries (Australia, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, France,
Germany, India, Israel, South Africa, Spain, Turkey and the USA). The authors are
all scholars highly qualified in themes related to gender. Each of the 12 chapters
gives a quick but comprehensive account of the recent constitutional history of the
country examined, then focuses on constitutional provisions about gender and on
a review of gender-related case law. Each chapter also offers a brief bibliography.
Technical aspects (e.g. the rules of constitutional proceedings) are plainly
explained, and thus the reading of the book, even if obviously easier for experts
in law, can be enjoyed by a larger public.
As the editors underline in their Introduction, the case law reported makes up
a possible ‘feminist constitutional agenda’, and brings together a large number of
themes. Most of them (from employment discrimination to political underrepre-
sentation) are common to the different countries; some (e.g. the rights to land
sacred to aboriginal women in Australia) are more specific to a single country.
Even if aware of the ‘discursive power’ of constitutions and of constitutional
jurisprudence, even if conscious that (as Isabel Karpin and Karen O’Connel write
in their profound essay on Australia) ‘The Constitution – any Constitution – is
limited by the forms of power in which it is embedded’ (p. 46), and that, on the
other hand, ‘the interests of women are not unitary but diverse’, the writings
collected in this book share on the whole the idea that constitutional provisions
and constitutional claims are useful tools in order to improve the condition of
women as a group, especially when fully implemented by the courts (where even
more women judges should sit), and provided that the mere ‘formal equality’
gives way to ‘substantive equality’.
Whereas formal equality (equality before the law) neutralizes differences
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between men and women and between women, substantive equality is expected
to be able to express, promote and protect differences between groups of indi-
viduals. Allowing reasonable and proportionate differences in treatment to
persons who find themselves in different de facto situations, substantive equality
is the principle that should grant positive or corrective measures specifically
applicable to women (or to groups of women, as women in minorities, poor,
lesbian, elderly women); it is the interpretative path to name male privileges and
to uncover the inequalities embedded both in gender-neutral laws and in pater-
nalistic benefits; and the judiciary instrument that makes it possible to overcome
oppression and subordination of women by recognizing for them, in the various
contexts of life (family, labour, decision-making processes, etc.), special and articu-
lated rights.
In the work of recognizing and implementing substantive equality, the courts
appear at times disappointing, at times progressive: the final comment that Blanca
Rodríguez Ruiz and Ute Sacksofsky make about the German Federal Constitu-
tional Court, ‘quite helpful’ but still having ‘a long way to go’, epitomizes the
opinion expressed in the book as a whole towards the outcomes of constitutional
jurisprudence.
The rich and varied case law reported (the very treasure which makes this book
simply precious) is nevertheless challenging. It questions some of the premises of
the analysis if not the possibility (or the opportunity) itself of selecting a portion
of constitutional jurisprudence as the one which – as the editors say – ‘pertains to
women’. The case law seems moreover to suggest that equality (even if substan-
tive) is always a very ambiguous, paradoxical way to make differences speak.
Let us think of the delicate theme of abortion. It is of course a matter of
‘women’s reproductive rights’, but the choice of addressing the courts is rarely
made by women. Constitutional proceedings on abortion arise from male claims
(as in the case of the Canadian doctor prosecuted for performing abortion,
reported by Beverley Baines) or from public initiatives (as that of the Government
of Bavaria in Germany). In effect, the complex balance of interests which the
courts in such cases realize goes to show that at stake are not the rights of women,
but the building of a ‘secular moral’, the drawing of boundaries (and linkages)
between State and Religion, the effort of the court to demonstrate that a ‘public
conscience’ does exist, aware of the needs of all the possible actors, unborn life
included, and that it is legitimate to answer the ‘ultimate questions’ such as the
beginning of life – the kind of questions that our culture likes to consider are
involved in abortion. Whether or not successful in terms of achieving legality of
abortion, the great narratives built up by the courts show that these kinds of
claims are an important area, and perhaps the more sensitive one, where consti-
tutional democracy constructs itself as a pluralistic arena. Far from outlining a
field merely pertaining to women, and thus separate from the rest of the
(‘neutral’?) constitutional agenda, litigations on abortion prove that issues
embodied in women are the cross-roads, the decisive points in the making of the
symbolic, discursive and normative construction of contemporary democracies.
Another example could be given: quotas and women’s representative rights. How
much are they an opportunity offered to women, and not an opportunity for the
suffering value of democracy to renovate itself and appear useful and good?
Following the balance of interests made up by the courts, we discover that
issues ‘pertaining to women’ are always situated at the heart of the most
important institutions of western or westernized societies. When the courts
discuss if maternal leave should or should not be extended to fathers, their
reasoning, which tries to balance the interests of the child, the paternal role, the
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problems of married or unmarried couples and so on, ends by putting the insti-
tution of the Family at the centre. Sometimes against the interests of women,
maybe, but always demonstrating that a fact is at work: the world is made up of
different people, who find themselves always in different relations (with regard to
this in Italian feminist thought, see Giardini, 2004). As women, as feminists, we
will always risk feeling defeated by the law, if we don’t allow ourselves to
perceive, recognize and say that, in its own way, the law always reveals the
dynamic strength of sexed relations. We will always feel displeased, if not
defeated, if we don’t stop waiting for the law to make ‘justice’ for women, without
becoming aware that women are already inside the law, at the centre of its (at
times, inconsistent) complex movements.
At times, we ourselves, as feminist lobbyists, law experts and scholars, do not
facilitate the interaction between differences and the law. If we keep on entering
claims to equality in the discourse of law, we should not be surprised when the
law replies paradoxically, or does not reply at all.
Let us think of the headscarf issue in Turkey (another question, where, as Hilal
Elver precisely observes, not only is a religious claim of women at stake, but a
whole idea of the public and private spheres). Some women affirm that the prohi-
bition of headscarves, e.g. in the universities, means that women and men are
treated unequally before the law, because, as Elver explains, ‘men who share the
same belief with women . . . are admitted to universities . . . since they have no
specific religious dress code’ (p. 295). The courts (the Turkish court and the
European Court of Human Rights) reply: sorry, you’re wrong, it’s just the wearing
of headscarves that creates ‘unequal treatment between male and female
believers’, so this form of dress must be prohibited in the name of equality
(pp. 294, 296). Tricky, of course, but these are the outcomes of equality – and of
substantive equality, also.
In this regard, we turn to the field of labour. The fight which in the 1990s took
place between the German courts and the European Court of Justice about quotas
(masterly reported by Rodríguez Ruiz and Sacksofsky) can be regarded as an
exemplary one. According to the European judges, quotas are inconsistent with
principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination when they give women
absolute priority over male candidates with equal qualifications. In this fight, the
national level speaks the language of a traditional constitutionalism innervated
with (progressive or stereotyped?) values, and the supranational actor speaks the
language of the uniformity of rules in the European context, which does not
tolerate too many special rights for women, given that they are a cost in terms of
market competition and free circulation of workers. The European Court of
Justice, which upholds a strict ‘non-discrimination’ principle to be applied across
the 25 countries of the European Union (not infrequently using this principle as a
weapon against protectionist legislation for women), reminds us that the claims
of substantive equality (special treatments granted out of protection of special
needs of special social groups, as women) are not a way to escape formal equality.
In legal reasoning, every special treatment must first of all be proportional to its
own end: a special treatment can never offer a disadvantaged group opportunities
that would entail the discrimination of another group. Second, every special
treatment must be justified on the basis of ‘concrete’ grounds: a ‘positive measure’
such as quotas finds its grounds in the ‘under-representation of women in the field
of Labour’. The grounds, which justify the positive measure, must continue to
exist. Otherwise, the special treatment becomes discriminatory. That is to say:
inconsistent with formal equality.
Thus, where would a battle for substantive equality bring us? There are two
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possibilities. The first would be that women and groups of women remain for ever
so problematic, so needy, as to merit eternally some kind of special treatment. The
second, that women and groups of women at last overcome their problems and
become, finally, equal. Are these the images of women we dream of?
A puzzling dilemma, perhaps recognized by those women who choose not to
argue their claims from the perspective of equality and non-discrimination, but
who defend their interests with arguments strictly related to the concrete features
of single cases (as the child interest in a Spanish litigation case about child
support, reported by Ruth Rubio-Marin). Were these women (and their lawyers,
whose sex it would be interesting to know, and not only that of the judges!) wrong,
or were they aware that equality is not the best way to express the centrality and
full legitimacy of women’s claims in the juridical discourse? In fact, they won, and
their victory (Rubio-Marin notes) was perceived as a victory for women.
Thanks to the editors and authors for a book that helps to pose questions
around the relevant theme of a feminist constitutional interpretation.
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CONTROVERSIAL, DISTASTEFUL OR NECESSARY? LET’S TALK ABOUT
RAPE
Merril D. Smith, ed.
Encyclopedia of Rape
Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2004, 301 pp., ISBN 0–3133–2687–8
Can a four-lettered word really a merit an entire encyclopaedia? When that word
is rape the answer has to be yes. If you take an interest in history, law, literature,
cultural studies, criminology, in fact any facet of life connected to gendered
relations, this book will prove a valuable addition to your bookshelves. To some
extent it is not a conventional encyclopaedia: there are no tables, graphs, charts or
illustrations. It is, however, a very readable series of cross-referenced articles that
collectively provide insight into the issue of rape from a range of perspectives. The
editor, Merril D. Smith, clearly states that the book takes a US focus to the subject
matter and this focus is generally adhered to throughout, although there are some
entries of historical and cultural relevance that go beyond these limits.
Aimed at the general reader, the Encyclopedia of Rape is a compendium of easily
accessible information on all aspects of rape. It is written in a jargon-free, straight-
forward style and features 186 entries written by 79 scholars covering concepts
and key individuals, emphasizing the historical and practical, rather than the
deeply theoretical. A chronology of rape history precedes the general entries and
spans events from the pre-Christian Babylonian code of Hammurabi, which legis-
lated on the guilt or innocence of rape victims determined by their marital status,
to the trial of Marc Dutroux in Belgium in 2004. It also provides alphabetical and
topical lists of entries, which help to save time for the browser who is unsure of
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